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All  countries  face  numerous  environmental  problems,  from  air  and  ocean  pollution  to  the 
existential  threat  posed  by  climate  change  and  many  more.  In  response,  many  nations  have 
negotiated  and  joined  international  environmental  agreements  to  alter  the  policies  of 
governments,  the  behaviors  of  their  citizens,  and  the  quality  of  their  national  and  the  global 
environment.  I  summarize  and  assess  theories  related  to  two  research  questions.  First,  how  do 
scholars  define  the  effectiveness  of  international  environmental  agreements?  Second,  what  are 
the  metrics  by  which  scholars  can  assess  the  structure  and  effectiveness  of  an  international 
environmental  agreement?  I  seek  to  answer  these  questions  by  conducting  a  review  of 
international  environmental  governance  literature  from  the  past  three  decades  using  a 
counterfactual  framework  -  comparing  what  occurred  in  the  real  world  with  a  treaty  in  effect  to 
what  one  would  have  expected  to  happen  if  that  treaty  didn’t  exist.  Ultimately,  I  conclude  that 
three  key  elements  influence  the  effectiveness  of  international  environmental  agreements:  the 
standards  by  which  one  measures  effectiveness,  the  degree  to  which  the  language  of  an 
agreement  utilizes  legalization,  flexibility,  and  specificity,  and  the  tools  environmental  regimes 
use  to  encourage  states  to  meet  their  commitments.  In  the  face  of  increasingly  urgent 
environmental  challenges,  the  most  promising  path  for  improving  effectiveness  is  the  integration 
of  these  three  essential  factors  into  the  treaty  writing,  ratification,  and  enforcement  processes. 
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Introduction 
From  air  pollution  to  overfishing  to  climate  change,  every  country  in  the  world  faces 
potentially  devastating  environmental  problems  daily.  In  response,  the  international  community 
has  created  a  wide  variety  of  international  environmental  agreements  (IEAs)   that  attempt  to 1
address  environmental  challenges,  from  the  1975  Convention  on  International  Trade  in 
Endangered  Species  of  Wild  Fauna  and  Flora  treaty  to  the  2015  Paris  Agreement  on  climate 
change.  This  paper  asks:  what  makes  international  environmental  agreements  effective? 
While  there  is  much  to  study  about  IEAs,  examining  the  success  of  an  IEA  stands  out,  a 
process  known  as  IEA  effectiveness.  Effectiveness  can  be  measured  by  comparing  what 
happened  with  an  IEA  to  what  would  have  happened  without  that  IEA  -  a  counterfactual  (Helm 
&  Sprinz,  2000;  Young,  2011;  Vollenweider,  2013)  -  and  seeing  if  the  behavior  of  states  was 
different  or  if  the  goals  of  an  IEA  were  reached  (Mitchell,  2009).  Then,  one  can  delve  into  the 
mechanisms  of  effectiveness,  such  as  why  states  make  the  decisions  that  they  do  (March  & 
Olsen,  1998;  Hovi  &  Underdal,  2018),  how  the  language  of  IEAs  influences  their  success 
(Helfer,  2013;  Kim,  2014)  and  the  various  mechanisms  that  regimes  promote  to  ensure 
effectiveness  (Chayes  &  Chayes,  1993;  Downs,  2000;  Young,  2018). 
This  paper  reviews  the  literature  on  theories  that  relate  to  two  research  questions: 
1. How  do  scholars  define  the  effectiveness  of  international  environmental  agreements? 
2. What  are  the  metrics  by  which  scholars  can  assess  the  structure  and  effectiveness  of  an 
international  environmental  agreement? 
1  Throughout  this  paper,  international  environmental  agreements  and  the  international  regimes,  like  the  United 
Nations,  that  administer  them  are  treated  largely  as  interchangeable  as  Young  (2011)  does.  This  is  done  because, 
while  there  are  certainly  differences  between  regimes  and  agreements,  they  share  a  great  deal  of  overlap  in  the 
theories  surrounding  the  definitions  of  and  mechanisms  for  their  effectiveness. 
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Briefly,  the  key  findings  of  this  paper  are  twofold.  First,  how  one  approaches  improving 
IEA  effectiveness  is  deeply  intertwined  with  and  influenced  by  how  effectiveness  itself  is 
defined.  In  the  sections  below,  behavior  change  and  goal  achievement  are  viewed  through  a 
counterfactual  framework,  which  means  that  the  most  effective  IEAs  are  those  that  influence  the 
actions  of  states  and  then  subsequently  reach  the  targeted  goals  of  the  agreement  (Mitchell, 
2009).  Indeed,  based  on  this  definition,  an  IEA  that  fails  to  change  the  behavior  of  a  state  cannot 
be  effective  nor  take  responsibility  for  the  achievement  of  IEA  goals,  because  such  attainment 
must  have  come  from  a  source  other  than  the  IEA  itself. 
Second,  in  order  to  maximize  the  effectiveness  of  an  IEA,  each  of  the  four  main  tools  for 
enforcing  IEAs  -  sanctions,  incentives,  norm-setting,  and  capacity-building  -  should  be  utilized 
together.  Making  use  of  all  four  mechanisms  best  addresses  the  two  central  binaries  that  explain 
state  decision  making  -  the  logics  of  consequences  and  appropriateness  (March  &  Olsen,  1998) 
and  willingness  versus  ability  (Hovi  &  Underdal,  2018)  -  and  increase  the  likelihood  of  the 
successful  deployment  of  a  method  or  combination  of  methods  that  changes  the  behavior  of  a 
state  and  achieves  the  goals  of  an  IEA. 
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Definitions  of  Effectiveness 
Following  Mitchell  (2009),  Vollenweider  (2013),  and  Young  (2011),  this  paper  defines 
effectiveness  by  asking:  is  the  world  different  with  a  given  IEA  relative  to  how  the  world  would 
have  been  without  that  IEA?  The  guiding  framework  for  this  paper  is  therefore  counterfactuals: 
comparing  what  did  happen  with  an  IEA  to  what  would  have  happened  without  an  IEA  (Young, 
2011).  This  contrasts  with  alternative  approaches  for  defining  effectiveness,  such  as  comparing 
what  actually  happened  to  what  the  IEA  sought  to  have  happen.  Once  the  idea  of  the 
counterfactual  is  fully  developed,  the  theory  surrounding  two  key  areas  where  it  most  comes  into 
play  -  changing  the  behavior  of  states  and  achieving  the  goals  of  an  IEA  -  will  be  examined. 
Counterfactuals 
The  literature  surrounding  counterfactuals  is  crucial  to  this  paper’s  analysis.  At  their  core, 
counterfactuals  involve  the  juxtaposition  of  observed  results  to  expected  results  (Young,  2011). 
From  this,  effectiveness  can  therefore  be  measured  by  comparing  “the  performance  of  regimes 
relative  not  only  to  the  probable  course  of  events  in  their  absence  (i.e.,  the  noregime 
counterfactual)  but  also  to  some  conception  of  an  ideal  outcome  known  as  the  collective 
optimum”  (Young,  2011,  p.  19854).  Several  scholars  offer  different  ways  that  counterfactuals  can 
be  defined  and  measured,  discussed  below. 
It  is  first  important  to  define  the  pure  counterfactual:  actual  behavior  as  viewed  against 
counterfactual,  or  expected,  behavior.  In  tackling  this,  Helm  and  Sprinz  (2000)  observe  that 
assessments  of  effectiveness  are  crucial  because  it  is  closely  related  to  how  public  policy  is 
evaluated,  which  is  therefore  critical  to  the  formation  of  IEAs  since  governments  want  to  know  if 
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it  is  worth  their  time  to  focus  on  international  governance.  However,  it  has  been  challenging  for 
governments  to  appropriately  value  IEAs  since  it  is  hard  to  quantify  the  effectiveness  of  a  given 
IEA.  To  address  this,  Helm  and  Sprinz  seek  to  “develop  a  general  measurement  concept  for 
assessing  the  degree  to  which  international  environmental  regimes  contribute  to  environmental 
problem  solving”  (Helm  &  Sprinz,  2000,  p.  631).  This  counterfactual  concept  measures  the 
effectiveness  of  the  IEA  by  comparing  what  actually  happened  as  a  result  of  the  regime  to  a 
specific  counterfactual,  namely  “the  hypothetical  state  of  affairs  that  would  have  come  about 
with  a  perfect  regime”  (Helm  &  Sprinz,  2000,  p.  633),  which  can  differ  from  the  environmental 
goals  an  IEA  targets.  The  methodology  and  results  produced  by  Helm  and  Sprinz  (2000)  are 
viewed  as  the  baseline  counterfactual  from  which  the  subsequent  authors  build. 
Helm  and  Sprinz  (2000)  also  build  on  the  pure  counterfactual  by  combining  it  with  what 
they  call  the  collective  optimum,  or  the  best  case  scenario  of  an  environmental  goal  that  could  be 
achieved  by  the  IEA,  to  create  their  final  counterfactual  measurement  index.  This  collective 
optimum  creates  a  new  perspective  for  viewing  the  effectiveness  of  a  given  IEA,  as  it  allows  one 
to  contrast  what  happened  and  how  much  change  it  created  as  compared  to  nothing  versus  what 
the  regime  wanted  to  happen  and  how  much  change  that  would  have  been  compared  to  nothing 
(Helm  &  Sprinz,  2000).  In  other  words,  Helm  and  Sprinz’s  overall  counterfactual  concept  creates 
room  for  comparisons  to  the  observed  world  as  well  as  the  measurement  of  progress  towards 
certain  IEA  goals,  which  allows  for  flexibility  in  measuring  IEA  effectiveness. 
Building  on  Helm  and  Sprinz,  Bernauer  and  Siegfried  (2008)  focus  specifically  on 
international  policies  that  regulate  cooperation  between  those  both  upstream  and  downstream  of 
river  basins.  In  this  field,  most  case  studies  that  examine  the  effectiveness  of  international 
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treaties  do  so  qualitatively  and  in  a  binary  manner,  which  tends  to  oversimplify  the  complex 
process  of  upstream-downstream  environmental  policymaking.  To  calculate  the  counterfactual 
component  of  this  process,  Bernauer  and  Siegfried  propose  the  policy  performance  metric,  or 
PER ,  a  “time-dependent  function  of:  (1)  the  outcome  that  should  ideally  be  reached  (optimum 
performance);  (2)  the  outcome  of  a  given  policy  at  the  time  of  measurement  (actual 
performance);  and  (3)  the  outcome  that  would  have  occurred  in  the  absence  of  this  policy 
(counterfactual  performance)”  (Bernauer  &  Siegfried,  2008,  p.  481).  Most  studies  find  that  there 
are  more  cases  of  upstream-downstream  problems  but  disagree  about  whether  these  inter-state 
interactions  are  positive  or  negative.  Using  their  PER  tool  as  explained  above,  Bernauer  and 
Siegfried  conclude  that  while  these  settings  lead  to  more  interaction,  the  relationship  that  forms 
can  more  often  than  not  be  categorized  as  negative,  not  positive. 
Finally,  Vollenweider  (2013)  outlines  three  different  quantitative  approaches  for  deriving 
a  given  IEA’s  counterfactual,  which  differ  because  of  the  “inherent  difficulty  to  justify  what  a 
state  would  have  done  if  it  did  not  join  the  institution…[a]s  this  behavior  involves  the 
unobserved  quantity  of  a  potential  outcome  in  the  absence  of  institutional  membership”  (p.  346). 
The  first  method  is  rooted  in  theory  and  involves  calculating  an  expected  result  (reduced 
emissions,  decreased  pollution,  etc.)  and  comparing  it  to  the  actual  observed  result  to  derive  an 
effectiveness  score.  However,  this  method  often  misses  the  actual  positive  or  negative  effect  of 
the  IEA  as  well  as  potential  complicating  variables,  such  as  unique  cultural  beliefs  or  shifts  in 
national  power  structures.  The  second  method  models  the  counterfactual  by  using  multiple 
regression  models  and  incorporating  all  potential  influencing  variables  to  determine  the  causal 
effect  of  an  IEA.  Unfortunately,  Vollenweider  notes  that  this  model  cannot  account  for  the  fact 
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that  IEAs  are  almost  exclusively  self-selecting  and  fails  to  address  the  same  variables  as  the  first 
method.  Finally  a  third  method  is  offered,  which  involves  employing  mathematical  causal 
inference  approaches  including  estimating  the  difference-in-differences  between  certain  variables 
to  attain  the  best  components  of  the  first  two  models.  All  three  methods  result  in  varied 
assessments  of  the  effectiveness  of  an  IEA  based  on  different  estimates  of  the  appropriate 
counterfactual. 
No  matter  how  one  chooses  to  measure  or  define  it,  understanding  the  concept  of  the 
counterfactual  is  essential  to  comprehending  the  definition  of  IEA  effectiveness.  It  involves 
some  measure  of  weighing  what  happened  in  the  real  world  to  what  would  have  happened  in  a 
“perfect  regime”  (Helm  &  Sprinz,  2000)  or  with  an  “optimum  performance”  (Bernauer  & 
Siegfried,  2008)  qualitatively  -  or  even  quantitatively  (Vollenweider,  2013).  Crucially,  it  is 
essential  to  note  that  while  counterfactuals  compare  actual  behavior  to  what  would  have 
happened  with  no  IEA,  goal  achievement  compares  actual  behavior  to  the  behavior  desired  by 
the  parties  of  an  environmental  regime  -  known  as  the  collective  optimum  -  which  could  be 
either  an  environmental  or  more  broadly  behavioral  goal.  While  they  both  fit  into  the  standard  of 
comparing  what  did  happen  to  what  might  have  happened,  understanding  the  difference  in 
criteria  is  critical.  With  that  in  mind,  the  next  two  sections  explore  how  the  concept  of  the 
counterfactual  can  be  applied  to  both  changing  the  behavior  of  states  and  to  achieving  the  goals 
of  a  given  IEA. 
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Behavior  Change 
The  first  and  largest  component  in  defining  effectiveness  involves  whether  an  IEA  can 
influence  the  actions  of  a  state  so  that  it  differs  from  the  estimated  counterfactual,  or  the  behavior 
of  the  state  without  the  IEA  (Mitchell,  2009;  see  also  Young,  2011).  In  discussing  the  same 
framework,  Sand  (2016)  calls  this  behavioral  effectiveness ,  asking  “which  are  the  measurable 
positive  changes  in  the  environmental  policies  and  practices  of  States  that  are  attributable  to  their 
participation  in  a  treaty?”  (Sand,  2016,  p.  3).  Whether  one  calls  it  behavior  change  or  behavioral 
effectiveness,  this  is  the  lynchpin  on  which  IEA  effectiveness  operates:  at  their  core, 
environmental  regimes  cannot  be  considered  successful  unless  they  can  convince  states  to  act 
differently  than  they  otherwise  would  have  without  the  regime  in  place. 
Measuring  Behavior  Change 
There  are  a  variety  of  methods  and  structures  through  which  one  can  measure  the  extent 
to  which  an  IEA  brought  about  a  change  in  behavior.  Mitchell  (2009)  offers  two  indicators  for 
the  influence  of  an  IEA:  outputs ,  which  include  the  “laws,  policies,  and  regulations  that  states 
adopt  to  transform  an  IEA  from  an  international  agreement  to  national  law”  (Mitchell,  2009,  p. 
148),  and  outcomes,  or  “changes  in  how  governments  or  sub-state  actors  behave”  (Mitchell, 
2009,  p.  148).  While  these  two  metrics  can  be  somewhat  incomplete  in  measuring  true  shifts  in 
motivation,  largely  due  to  the  potential  presence  of  other  complicating  variables  such  as  a  new 
government  coming  into  power  or  changes  in  the  national  or  global  economy  (Mitchell,  2009), 
using  outputs  and  outcomes  as  tools  can  reveal  the  influence  of  an  environmental  regime  when 
one  examines  both  the  words  and  actions  of  a  state  -  especially  by  using  the  counterfactual. 
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Young  (2011)  agrees,  arguing  that  using  the  framework  of  behavior  change,  and  specifically 
examining  whether  or  not  an  IEA  created  new  types  of  state  behavior  than  existed  previously  or 
would  have  existed  without  the  IEA,  offers  a  clear  pathway  for  measuring  effectiveness. 
Moreover,  quantifying  behavior  is  crucial  to  defining  IEA  effectiveness  because 
measuring  if  behavior  has  been  changed  by  an  IEA  lies  at  the  cornerstone  for  determining 
success  (Mitchell,  2009;  see  also  Young,  2011).  The  simplest  way  to  understand  the  necessity  of 
behavior  is  to  examine  an  IEA  aimed  at  reducing  atmospheric  sulfur  dioxide  concentrations,  the 
goal,  by  decreasing  reliance  on  coal  power  plants,  the  targeted  behavior  (Vollenweider,  2013).  In 
one  scenario,  sulfur  dioxide  concentrations  in  states  decrease,  but  the  prevalence  of  coal  power 
plants  stays  the  same,  meaning  that  the  IEA  could  not  have  been  the  driving  force  in  achieving 
the  goal.  Similarly,  a  second  situation  results  in  sulfur  dioxide  concentrations  decreasing,  but 
rather  than  states  shifting  away  from  coal  power  plants,  they  instead  turned  to  new  technologies 
that  reduce  the  amount  of  sulfur  emissions  per  ton  of  coal  burned.  Here,  the  goal  of  the  IEA  was 
again  achieved,  but  with  the  creation  of  a  new  and  different  environmental  policy,  rather  than 
through  the  targeted  behavior.  Either  way,  behavior  was  not  changed  as  a  result  of  the  IEA 
coming  into  force,  illustrating  the  fact  that  behavior  is  a  necessary  condition  and  an  important 
piece  of  evidence  in  determining  whether  or  not  an  IEA  was  effective  (see  Hovi  &  Underdal, 
2018;  Ringquist  &  Kostadinova,  2005). 
There  is  also  a  small  subset  of  theory  centered  around  how  IEAs  can  not  only  shape 
international  politics  and  decision-making  behavior  on  a  larger  scale,  but  how  their  structure  and 
goals  can  also  trickle  down  to  the  domestic  level.  Ringquist  and  Kostadinova  (2005)  argue  that 
IEAs  provide  a  driving  force  for  national  environmental  policy  by  creating  guidelines  for  what 
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change  is  needed  and  how  to  achieve  such  a  change.  Downs  (2000)  agrees,  arguing  that  national 
leaders  are  more  likely  to  change  their  behavior  when  they  buy  into  the  legitimacy  of  an 
environmental  regime  in  a  process  is  known  as  legitimation ,  which  is  largely  influenced  by  the 
level  of  regime  democracy,  the  age  of  the  regime,  the  quality  of  states  who  support  it,  and 
whether  or  not  the  regime  possesses  high  standards  of  consensus.  While  this  is  notable  because 
the  idea  that  IEAs  can  influence  both  national  and  domestic  behavior  offers  multiple  levels  of 
analysis  on  the  influence  of  a  given  regime,  it  is  also  important  to  recognize  that  many  changes 
coded  as  ‘international’  are  in  fact  domestic  changes,  from  passing  environmental  laws  to 
changing  national  policy  goals  (Downs,  2000;  Ringquist  &  Kostadinova,  2005).  Separating  the 
different  scales  of  behavior  change  driven  by  an  IEA,  however,  is  an  area  of  research  that  this 
paper  does  not  discuss  in  an  effort  to  remain  focused  on  effectiveness. 
Drawbacks  of  Using  Behavior  Change 
While  behavior  change  remains  the  clearest  and  most  visible  indicator  of  the  success  -  or 
failure  -  of  an  IEA,  there  are  certainly  some  flaws  in  using  behavior  as  the  primary  indication  of 
effectiveness.  Mitchell  (2009)  notes  that  analyzing  state  actions  involves  overcoming  issues  with 
endogeneity  that  arise  “when  the  causes  of  a  policy  also  influence  the  policies  adopted  to  resolve 
it”  (Mitchell,  2009,  p.  153).  This  is  generally  the  case  because  of  a  selection  bias  that  forms  as 
states  are  more  likely  to  accept  rewards  than  sanctions  -  and  more  likely  to  join  IEAs  that  they 
were  planning  to  comply  with  than  those  they  were  not  (see  also  Vollenweider,  2013). 
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Fundamentally,  then,  it  can  simply  be  hard  to  determine  if  an  observed  behavior  change 
was  truly  driven  by  the  influence  of  an  environmental  regime.  In  seeking  to  address  this  problem, 
Mitchell  (2009)  offers  the  following  table  for  examining  the  complex  relationship  between 
behavior  change  and  effectiveness: 
The  relationship  of 
compliance  and  effectiveness 
Effectiveness  (behavior 
influenced  by  IEA) 
Non-effectiveness  (behavior 
NOT  influenced  by  IEA) 
Compliance  (behavior  meets 
agreement  standards) 
Treaty-induced  compliance Coincidental  compliance 
Non-compliance  (behavior 
does  NOT  meet  agreement 
standards) 
Good  faith  non-compliance Intentional  non-compliance 
 
As  the  table  above  illustrates,  one  type  of  behavior  change  is  known  as  coincidental 
compliance,  where,  although  behavior  meets  the  standards  outlined  in  the  IEA,  the  regime  cannot 
solely  take  the  credit.  This  can  happen  because  states  purposely  negotiate  a  low  bar  of  entry  -  as 
in  the  case  of  the  1985  Convention  on  Long  Range  Transboundary  Air  Pollution,  whose  starting 
point  for  sulfur  emissions  reductions  had  already  been  met  by  most  parties  before  the  agreement 
was  even  signed  (Mitchell,  2009).  On  the  whole,  Mitchell  (2009)  uses  the  above  table  to  focus 
on  the  differences  across  columns  -  defining  effectiveness  through  the  counterfactual  -  rather 
than  the  difference  between  rows  -  which  is  an  argument  about  compliance,  a  concept  this  paper 
dispenses  with  through  the  Compliance  section  below. 
Nonetheless,  using  the  counterfactual  to  compare  what  the  behavior  of  a  state  was  after 
an  IEA  came  into  force  -  whether  through  the  actions  they  are  taking  or  policies  they  are  putting 
into  law  -  as  opposed  to  what  it  would  have  been  without  the  presence  of  any  environmental 
regime  is  the  clearest  way  to  define  whether  or  not  an  IEA  was  effective. 
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Goal  Achievement 
The  other  major  component  that  shapes  effectiveness  includes  what  goals  an  IEA  seeks  to 
achieve  as  well  as  how  it  focuses  on  addressing  an  environmental  problem  itself  and  the  political 
and  economic  behaviors  that  have  contributed  to  its  creation  (Helm  &  Sprinz,  2000;  Houghton  & 
Naughton,  2014).  This  is  the  major  standard  by  which  many  regimes  evaluate  themselves,  as  the 
goals  of  an  IEA  -  reduce  carbon  emissions,  cut  down  on  overfishing,  stop  deforestation  -  are  the 
most  visible  components  of  any  environmental  regime.  Ultimately,  goal  achievement  is  not  only 
a  measure  by  which  scholars  can  define  the  effectiveness  of  an  environmental  regime,  but  also 
how  parties  to  the  regime  itself  measure  effectiveness  -  although  note  that  while  goal 
achievement  here  uses  the  counterfactual,  states  within  a  regime  might  simply  ask  whether  or  not 
a  goal  was  achieved  instead  of  using  the  theoretical  framework  offered  by  the  counterfactual. 
It  is  also  crucial  to  point  out  that  goal  achievement  is  inherently  reliant  on  behavior 
change  when  considering  the  effectiveness  of  an  IEA.  In  other  words,  if  the  goal  of  an  IEA  is  to 
reduce  carbon  emissions,  and  the  behavior  change  needed  is  to  reduce  a  state’s  usage  of  oil,  the 
goal  cannot  be  achieved  without  first  changing  the  behavior  of  a  state.  Indeed,  behavior  could  be 
changed  and  a  goal  left  unachieved  -  a  state  could  stop  using  oil  but  turn  to  natural  gas, 
continuing  to  emit  carbon  -  but  if  a  goal  is  achieved  without  behavior  being  changed,  then  the 
IEA  cannot  have  been  the  primary  force  behind  such  an  achievement.  Therefore,  while  this  paper 
examines  both  behavior  change  and  goal  achievement  as  separate  facets  in  defining  IEA 
effectiveness,  they  are  fundamentally  intertwined.  No  matter  how  one  examines  the  issue,  goal 
achievement  is  functionally  dependent  on  changing  the  behavior  of  states  when  it  comes  to 
evaluating  the  effectiveness  of  an  IEA. 
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Measuring  Goal  Achievement 
In  discussing  how  a  goal  is  approached  when  it  seeks  to  address  an  environmental 
challenge  -  Sand  (2016)  poses  a  question  regarding  what  he  dubs  the  ecological  effectiveness  of 
an  IEA:  “how  successfully  have  the  environmental  problems  targeted  by  a  treaty  been  solved  or 
mitigated  as  a  result  of  cooperative  action  by  the  contracting  States?”  (Sand,  2016,  p.  3). 
Mitchell  (2009)  builds  on  Sand’s  idea  of  ecological  effectiveness  by  pointing  out  that  many  IEAs 
are  evaluated  on  one  facet  of  their  effectiveness:  impacts  -  or  t he  various  observable  “changes  in 
environmental  quality”  (Mitchell,  2009,  p.  149),  which  allows  for  direct  observation  on  the 
effectiveness  of  a  given  IEA.  However,  while  these  often  appear  to  be  the  most  easily  measured 
and  consistently  accurate  factors  -  if  a  state  emitted  two  million  tons  of  sulfur  dioxide  one  year 
and  one  million  the  next,  one  might  assume  that  the  impact  of  the  IEA  was  positive  -  just 
because  change  was  made  and  a  goal  was  achieved  does  not  automatically  mean  the  IEA  was  the 
main  force  behind  the  achievement.  As  noted  throughout  this  paper,  there  are  a  variety  of 
alternative  explanations,  such  as  a  change  in  national  leadership  or  an  economic  recession,  that 
could  have  brought  about  the  observed  shift  in  impacts  -  and  it  is  essential  to  keep  this  in  mind. 
With  the  framework  of  impacts  and  the  challenges  of  measuring  goal  achievement  in 
mind,  Helm  and  Sprinz  (2000)  worked  to  develop  a  tool  that  attempted  to  address  these  concerns 
while  still  allowing  one  to  measure  whether  a  goal  was  achieved,  as  described  in  the 
Counterfactuals  section  above.  A  key  factor  of  Helm  and  Sprinz’s  measurement  tool  is  that  it 
focuses  on  both  the  environmental  impacts  of  IEAs  as  well  as  the  other  environmental  and 
socioeconomic  effects  of  such  agreements,  as  the  former  can  be  harder  to  directly  observe  and 
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carry  a  significant  lag  time  while  the  latter  have  been  previously  explored  and  quantified  by 
other  scholars.  Thus,  Helm  and  Sprinz’s  concept  manages  to  address  some  of  the  flaws  in 
measuring  goal  achievement  -  as  detailed  below  -  by  providing  a  method  for  measuring  success 
in  achieving  both  an  environmental  goal  and  the  social  and  political  variables  that  surround  it. 
Drawbacks  of  Analyzing  Goal  Achievement 
Although  goal  achievement  is  certainly  a  major  indicator  of  IEA  influence,  it  is  not 
without  flaw  as  a  component  of  defining  effectiveness.  Notably,  several  authors  have  pointed  out 
that  focusing  too  narrowly  on  environmental  goals  can  be  overly  restrictive,  as  many  of  the 
variables  one  would  measure  to  determine  if  progress  has  been  made  on  an  IEA  are  so 
slow-moving  that  measurement  and  comparison  become  challenging  (Houghton  &  Naughton, 
2014;  Ringquist  &  Kostadinova,  2005).  In  particular,  Ringquist  and  Kostadinova  (2005)  argue 
that  commonly  used  environmental  variables,  such  as  air  pollution  or  carbon  emissions,  can  be 
hard  to  untangle  from  other  social  or  economic  drivers.  Houghton  and  Naughton  (2014)  add  to 
this,  noting  that  IEA  studies  that  focus  exclusively  on  short-term  changes  in  the  environmental 
variable  -  ‘was  pollution  reduced  the  year  after  the  agreement  was  signed?’  -  seemed  unable  to 
find  an  IEA  effect  in  either  direction,  again  given  the  slow  pace  with  which  these  changes  and 
the  economy  move.  Therefore,  when  studies  point  to  an  IEA  as  ‘ineffective’,  it  is  important  to 
recognize  the  inherent  difficulty  in  evaluating  IEAs  until  after  a  sufficient  amount  of  time  has 
passed  such  that  one  might  expect  their  influence  to  be  evident. 
Additionally,  Mitchell  (2009)  argues  that  the  IEAs  that  end  up  being  ratified  are 
inherently  more  watered  down  then  they  need  to  be  to  actually  address  the  environmental 
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problems.  This  often  happens  because  of  vertical  disintegration ,  as  governments  depend  on 
support  from  domestic  actors  to  secure  international  agreements,  which  complicate  commitments 
as  each  layer  of  a  nation’s  government  has  differing  demands  for  the  contents  given  agreement 
(Hovi  &  Underdal,  2018).  Ultimately,  the  trickle-down  nature  of  such  policymaking  can 
eventually  strip  the  IEA  of  any  truly  bold  or  necessary  goals,  making  the  achievement  of  such 
goals  a  less  impressive  and  less  impactful  result. 
Separating  Goals  from  Impacts 
A  critical  connection  to  unravel  is  the  relationship  between  goal  achievement  and 
observing  environmental  impacts.  In  most  IEAs,  the  goal  the  regime  is  trying  to  achieve  is  an 
environmental  impact  -  e.g.  to  maintain  a  safe  population  of  whales  to  avoid  driving  them  into 
extinction  -  and  therefore,  the  two  topics  are  often  conflated  with  one  another  (Mitchell,  2009). 
However,  goal  achievement  does  not  have  to  center  on  impacts,  as  it  could  instead  focus  on  the 
underlying  structures  of  behavior  rather  than  the  impacts  themselves  (Young,  2011).  Put  another 
way,  an  IEA  seeking  to  address  climate  change  could  target  behavior,  such  as  burning  fossil 
fuels,  that  increases  emissions,  or  simply  call  for  a  decrease  in  the  atmospheric  concentration  of 
carbon.  That  same  IEA  could  also  seek  to  reduce  carbon  emissions  by  increasing  investments  in 
energy  efficiency  and  clean  energy  programs.  A  goal  is  simply  a  target  to  be  reached,  and 
whether  it  is  done  through  singling  out  behavior  or  an  environmental  impact  is  entirely  distinct. 
Furthermore,  the  process  of  vertical  disintegration,  as  described  in  the  section  above 
(Hovi  &  Underdal,  2018;  Mitchell,  2009),  can  sometimes  strip  regime  goals  of  the  environmental 
impacts  that  they  should  be  targeting  or  reduce  the  degree  to  which  the  IEA  can  address  such 
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impacts.  This  can  highlight  the  level  to  which  goal  achievement  and  environmental  impacts 
overlap  with  one  another  -  although  they  are  separate  features,  they  can  both  be  affected 
similarly  throughout  the  creation,  ratification,  and  enforcement  of  an  IEA. 
While  goal  achievement  and  environmental  impacts  are  often  conflated  with  one  another, 
understanding  that  not  every  goal  contained  within  an  IEA  has  to  be  centered  on  an 
environmental  impact  is  critical.  Making  this  difference  clear  is  crucial  to  comprehending  the 
theory  outlined  in  this  section  as  well  as  grasping  how  goal  achievement  and  its  relationship  to 
behavior  change  and  effectiveness  more  broadly  are  discussed  throughout  this  paper. 
Compliance 
Compliance  involves  determining  whether  a  state  is  following  the  rules  of  an  IEA  and,  if 
they  are  failing  to  comply  with  their  commitments,  examining  the  reasons  for  such  failure.  This 
also  includes  a  growing  area  of  theory  that  involves  contrasting  the  compliance  rates  of  public 
environmental  regimes  with  private  ones  (Grabs,  2018).  However,  unlike  both  behavior  change 
and  goal  achievement  -  which  wield  a  counterfactual  framework  of  comparing  what  happened 
with  an  IEA  as  opposed  to  what  would  have  happened  without  the  IEA  -  compliance  compares 
observed  behavior  or  the  achievement  of  goals  to  the  law  as  opposed  to  the  counterfactual 
(Young,  2011;  see  also  Grabs,  2018).  While  this  can  be  an  incredibly  valuable  way  to  define 
effectiveness,  it  does  not  fit  into  the  context  of  this  literature  review,  which  centers  on  the  usage 
of  counterfactuals  as  a  guiding  principle.  Therefore,  this  paper  will  not  explore  the  theory 
surrounding  compliance  -  or  the  subsets  of  compliance,  like  performance  -  because  this  is  a 
version  of  change  largely  devoid  of  counterfactuals  and  therefore  not  relevant  here.  
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Mechanisms  for  Effectiveness 
With  the  various  definitions  of  effectiveness  laid  out,  one  can  dive  into  the  mechanisms 
by  which  effectiveness  can  be  achieved.  This  section  has  three  parts,  offering  a  background  of 
why  states  behave  the  way  they  do,  discussing  different  rule  structures  for  IEAs,  and 
summarizing  the  tools  regimes  encourage  the  use  of  to  enforce  agreements. 
Understanding  Decision  Making 
Before  one  can  delve  into  handling  the  rules  of  and  responses  to  IEAs,  it  is  crucial  to 
understand  why  states  do  or  do  not  comply  with  a  given  environmental  regime.  While  there  are  a 
variety  of  frameworks  for  comprehending  the  background  of  states’  decision  making,  this  review 
engages  in  the  two  most  prominent  views:  March  and  Olsen’s  (1998)  logics  of  consequences 
versus  appropriateness  and  Hovi  and  Underdal’s  (2018)  framing  of  willingness  versus  ability. 
Using  these  two  dichotomies  helps  set  the  scene  for  enforcing  effective  IEAs. 
Logics  of  Action 
The  primary  perspective  in  this  review  for  understanding  decision  making  are  the  logics 
of  action,  as  proposed  by  March  and  Olsen  (1998)  and  elaborated  upon  by  Mitchell  (2009).  In 
this  framework,  states  make  decisions  either  through  a  logic  of  consequences ,  where  actors 
operate  along  clear,  explicit  cost-benefit  calculations,  or  a  logic  of  appropriateness ,  which  posits 
that  states  take  values  into  account  and  therefore  the  influence  of  IEAs  “stems  from  their  ability 
to  establish,  strengthen,  and  codify  norms  of  ‘right’  and  ‘wrong’  behavior”  (Mitchell,  2009,  p. 
155).  Crucially,  while  the  two  logics  are  certainly  distinct  and  separate  pathways  for 
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understanding  state  behavior,  they  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  and  any  given  action  usually 
involves  elements  of  each  logic.  Indeed,  most  states  are  “constituted  both  by  their  interests,  by 
which  they  evaluate  their  expected  consequences,  and  by  the  rules  embedded  in  their  identities 
and  political  institutions.  They  calculate  consequences  and  follow  rules,  and  the  relationship 
between  the  two  is  often  subtle”  (March  &  Olsen,  1998,  p.  952).  Therefore,  while  each  logic  is 
evaluated  and  often  used  as  an  analytical  tool  separately,  it  is  important  to  recognize  how  they 
are  inherently  interconnected.  
  The  logic  of  consequences  sees  international  politics  as  “arising  from  negotiation  among 
rational  actors  pursuing  personal  preferences  or  interests  in  circumstances  in  which  there  may  be 
gains  to  coordinated  action”  (March  &  Olsen,  1998,  p.  949),  distilling  decisions  made  by  states 
down  to  the  core  logical  factors  that  might  be  an  influence.  Consequently,  a  successful  IEA 
operating  within  this  logic  may  cause  states  to  “forego  independent  decision  making  in  favor  of 
interdependent  decision  making”  (Mitchell,  2009,  p.  159),  choosing  to  weigh  environmental 
problem  solving  as  a  tool  to  achieve  more  traditional  methods  of  international  success,  such  as 
strengthening  the  economy  or  improving  one’s  reputational  standing  in  international  circles. 
Conversely,  the  logic  of  appropriateness  sees  actions  as  norm-based  and  assumes  that 
actors  will  “follow  rules  that  associate  particular  identities  to  particular  situations,  approaching 
individual  opportunities  for  action  by  assessing  similarities  between  current  identities  and  choice 
dilemmas  and  more  general  concepts  of  self  and  situations”  (March  &  Olsen,  1998,  p.  951). 
Within  this  logic,  then,  states  would  ostensibly  follow  the  norms  set  by  an  international  regime 
even  if  it  would  not  automatically  pass  a  cost-benefit  analysis,  like  in  the  case  of  the  1960 
Nuclear  Test  Ban  Treaty,  which  set  the  norm  that  openly  testing  nuclear  weapons  was 
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unacceptable  and  was  remarkably  effective  in  reducing  such  behavior  (Mitchell,  2009).  This  can 
then  trickle  down  to  the  sub-state  level,  as  corporations  and  NGOs  “often  do  not  ask  ‘is 
complying  with  these  laws  in  our  interests’  but  instead  simply  ask  ‘what  is  the  law?’”  (Mitchell, 
2009,  p.  162),  which  often  means  IEAs  are  more  effective  on  the  sub-state  level  as  opposed  to  on 
the  international  level. 
Potential  and  Desire  for  Change 
The  second  framework  that  further  helps  to  understand  the  behavior  of  states  is  finding  a 
way  to  comprehend  a  given  states’  drive  for  change  -  and  if  they  have  the  capacity  to  even 
change  in  the  first  place.  Most  scholars  agree  that  IEAs  tend  to  be  comprised  of  three  broad 
components:  “describing  and  diagnosing  problems,  developing  and  adopting  policy  ‘cures’,  and 
implementing  these  cures”  (Hovi  &  Underdal,  2018,  p.  1).  However,  while  most  studies  of 
effectiveness  tend  to  focus  on  the  final  component,  the  IEA  itself,  this  perspective  focuses  on  the 
influence  IEAs  exert  on  the  first  two  steps,  describing  problems  and  adopting  policy. 
The  first  facet  of  implementation  is  a  party’s  willingness  to  deliver  on  an  IEA,  or  if  they 
actually  plan  on  following  through  with  the  commitments  outlined  in  a  given  agreement.  One 
can  generally  sort  states  into  three  categories  of  willingness  (Hovi  &  Underdal,  2018,  pp.  3-4): 
1. False  positives  sign  agreements  despite  having  no  intention  of  following  through  on  them 
to  cash  in  on  reputational  benefits  or  avoid  sanctions. 
2. Reluctant  positives  sign  agreements  and  intend  to  follow  through  on  them,  but  back  out 
due  to  changes  in  outside  factors,  fear  of  other  countries  not  following  through  on  their 
commitments,  or  anything  that  increases  compliance  costs  and/or  reduces  benefits. 
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3. False  negatives  are  governments  who  do  not  join  IEAs  and  nevertheless  behave  largely 
as  prescribed  in  these  agreements,  e.g.  the  United  States  shifting  to  natural  gas  and 
reducing  reliance  on  coal  despite  not  joining  any  IEA. 
The  second  facet  within  implementation  is  ability,  or  the  fact  that  a  government  trying  to 
honor  its  commitments  in  good  faith  may  have  trouble  creating  and  following  through  on 
changes.  As  summarized  in  the  Behavior  Change  section  above,  Mitchell  (2009)  notes  that  this 
arises  when  an  IEA  that  was  effective  in  changing  the  behavior  of  a  state  still  results  in 
non-compliant  behavior.  On  an  international  level,  while  one  can  zoom  in  and  evaluate  the 
effectiveness  of  an  IEA  on  a  single  nation  or  group  of  nations’  ability  to  make  change,  the  global 
nature  of  some  environmental  problems  means  that  90%  of  states  can  comply  perfectly  with  an 
IEA  but  10%,  all  high-impact  states,  can  fail  to  do  so  and  undo  the  overall  progress  (Hovi  & 
Underdal,  2018).  Domestically,  since  governments  depend  on  support  from  a  variety  of  domestic 
actors  -  from  high-reputation  NGOs  to  profitable  and  influential  multinational  corporations  -  to 
secure  international  agreements,  a  policy  can  get  watered  down  through  vertical  disintegration, 
described  in  the  Goal  Achievement  section  above  (Hovi  &  Underdal,  2018).  Beyond  navigating 
complex  and  bureaucratic  systems,  ability  also  includes  the  actual  capacity  a  state  has  in 
complying  with  IEA  commitments.  Some  states  simply  lack  the  infrastructure,  stability,  and 
resources  needed  to  address  environmental  problems  without  help,  entailing  capacity-building 
efforts  (Hovi  &  Underdal,  2018)  -  covered  more  in  the  Managing  Responses  section  below. 
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Setting  the  Rules 
The  main  component  of  IEAs  that  influences  their  effectiveness  involves  the  rules  and 
guidelines  that  are  foundational  to  their  structure.  Those  who  study  this  facet  of  IEAs  generally 
discuss  three  key  terms:  legalization ,  the  codification  of  norms  and  expectations  into  the  official 
wording  of  an  agreement  (Kim,  2014;  see  also  Sand,  2016);  flexibility,  the  mutability  of  an  IEA 
based  on  the  parties  (Helfer,  2013);  and  specificity,  how  clearly  the  IEA  defines  goals  and 
benchmarks  for  progress  (Klinsky,  2016).  All  three  factors  are  discussed  in  more  detail  below. 
Legalization 
Legalization  mechanisms  include  the  facets  of  IEAs  concerned  with  strict  regulation,  e.g. 
making  ‘unspoken’  regime  rules  official  to  avoid  such  conflicts  with  states  meeting  their 
commitments.  Legalization  is  the  difference  between  states  signing  a  declaration  on  ocean 
pollution  that  mentions  overfishing  in  passing  or  an  agreement  that  singles  out  overfishing  as 
directly  related  to  the  rate  at  which  an  ocean  is  polluted.  Sand  (2016)  points  out  how  important 
this  distinction  can  be,  as  having  an  IEA  with  a  low  level  of  legalization  can  make  it  easier  for  a 
state  to  claim  they  are  meeting  their  commitment  than  a  more  highly  legalized  IEA  -  and  indeed, 
increasing  legalization  can  affect  how  states  view  commitments  (Chayes  &  Chayes,  2013). 
However,  in  looking  at  a  wide  variety  of  IEAs  handling  environmental  problems  ranging  from 
air  pollution  to  the  dumping  of  toxins  in  the  ocean,  while  “[m]ore  legally  regulated  IEAs  are 
likely  to  be  more  conducive  to  economic  growth”  (Kim,  2014,  p.  309),  these  types  of  IEAs 
consistently  fail  to  reduce  environmental  degradation  as  much  as  a  less  legalized  regime  might 
reduce  it  (Kim,  2014),  indicating  the  importance  of  flexibility,  discussed  next. 
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Flexibility 
Flexibility  describes  the  rigidity  of  an  IEA  and  is  helpful  in  determining  how  a  regime 
responds  to  unexpected  changes,  from  new  demands  by  states  to  changes  in  the  global  economy 
(Helfer,  2013).  Flexibility  mechanisms  touch  on  the  components  of  IEAs  that  adjust  based  on  the 
economies,  commitments,  and  unique  variables  of  individual  parties  (Kim,  2014)  and  are  crucial 
to  understanding  the  negotiations  that  go  into  treaty  ratification  (Mitchell,  2009).  These  take 
many  forms  and  are  divided  into  formal  and  informal  mechanisms  as  well  as  the  phase  of  a  treaty 
during  which  they  appear,  as  shown  in  the  table  below  (Helfer,  2013,  p.  179): 
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Recognizing  that  there  are  too  many  flexibility  mechanisms  to  succinctly  cover,  Helfer 
(2013)  focuses  on  two  specific  types:  exit  clauses,  which  outline  the  pathways  for  a  state  to  leave 
an  agreement,  and  escape  clauses,  which  offer  methods  for  a  regime  party  to  suspend  their 
commitments  without  completely  withdrawing.  Overall,  he  concludes  that  such  mechanisms  are 
not  “superfluous,  boilerplate,  or  symbolic  provisions  that  appear  in  the  final  clauses  of  treaties 
out  of  habit  or  happenstance”  but  instead  are  a  key  component  in  how  “states  make  tradeoffs 
among  potentially  available  flexibility  tools  in  an  attempt  to  calculate  an  overall  level  of  treaty 
risk”  (Helfer,  2013,  p.  190).  In  short,  even  in  IEAs  that  appear  on  the  surface  to  be  inflexible 
agreements,  flexibility  still  exists  as  a  major  tool  that  states  and  regimes  consider  as  they  set  the 
rules  of  a  given  IEA. 
Moreover,  while  many  scholars  have  debated  the  specific  benefits  of  an  IEA  with 
increased  flexibility,  Kim’s  research  finds  that  “the  results  of  flexibility  elements  reflect  a 
positive  effect  both  in  the  environmental  and  economic  models”  (Kim,  2014,  p.  312).  In  other 
words,  IEAs  appear  to  be  more  effective  when  they  adopt  a  less  rigid  regulatory  structure  by 
incorporating  some  or  all  of  the  flexibility  mechanisms  outlined  above  by  Helfer  (2013). 
Ultimately,  Mitchell  (2009)  notes  that,  while  some  environmental  activists  view  increased 
flexibility  as  the  intentional  creation  of  loopholes  that  allow  states  to  shirk  their  commitments, 
without  such  mechanisms,  states  who  are  considered  central  to  the  success  of  a  regime  might  not 
even  join  it  in  the  first  place. 
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Specificity 
Finally,  specificity  deals  with  the  exactness  of  an  agreement,  or  how  precisely  it  seeks  to 
measure  success  or  failure  of  the  variables  included  within  the  IEA.  This  can  vary  widely,  as  a 
vague  IEA  with  low  specificity  seeking  to  protect  wetlands  might  call  for  sustainable  and 
sensible  development,  whereas  a  highly  specific  IEA  would  instead  demand  that  no  more  than 
15%  of  every  100  acres  of  wetland  may  be  developed.  Klinsky  (2016)  points  to  the  importance 
of  specificity  in  incorporating  aspects  of  social  justice  into  IEAs  such  as  the  2015  Paris 
Agreement,  noting  that  how  such  agreements  phrase  both  the  climate-specific  interpretations  of 
social  justice  as  well  as  the  specific  mechanisms  by  which  environmental  regimes  can 
incorporate  aspects  of  justice  is  critical  to  evaluating  whether  they  have  been  successful  in 
achieving  such  goals  (Klinsky,  2016).  
Furthermore,  much  like  with  legalization,  increasing  the  specificity  of  an  IEA  can 
increase  a  state’s  understanding  of  the  nuances  of  their  commitment,  although  this  does  not 
automatically  translate  to  a  change  in  behavior  or  the  achievement  of  an  IEA  goal  (Chayes  & 
Chayes,  2013;  Hovi  &  Underdal,  2018).  Nonetheless,  since  this  paper  deals  almost  exclusively 
with  highly  specific  agreements  -  which  are  both  the  most  common  amongst  IEAs  as  well  as  the 
most  easily  examined,  given  the  clear  targets  they  include  -  specificity  as  a  concept  is  not 
discussed  in  more  detail  in  this  review.  
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Managing  Responses 
Once  the  rules  of  an  IEA  have  been  discussed  and  the  agreement  has  been  signed  and 
ratified,  states  may  begin  to  make  efforts  towards  fulfilling  their  commitments.  There  is  a  wide 
variety  of  theory  surrounding  the  tactics  IEAs  use  to  successfully  approach  and  handle  the 
reactions  of  states  and  encourage  behavior  that  achieves  its  goals.  This  paper  engages  with  four 
of  the  primary  strategies  regimes  used  by  environmental  regimes:  sanctions,  incentives,  the 
setting  of  norms,  and  capacity-building. 
These  four  tools  all  center  on  a  major  divide  within  the  theory  on  response  management 
involving  two  main  schools  of  thought:  the  enforcement  school  and  the  managerial  school.  The 
enforcement,  or  realist,  school  includes  those  who  argue  for  stricter  forms  of  enforcing  IEAs  that 
tend  to  involve  negative  reinforcement,  including  trade  sanctions  and  exclusion  from 
international  groups  (Chayes  &  Chayes,  1993;  Mitchell,  2009).  In  contrast,  the  managerial,  or 
normative,  school  argues  that  these  forms  of  enforcement  are  “inappropriate  given  the  absence  of 
any  exploitative  intent…[and]  too  costly,  too  political,  and  too  coercive”  (Downs  et  al.,  1996,  p. 
381)  and  instead  pushes  for  softer  and  less  rigid  enforcement  built  on  persuasion  and 
norm-setting  (Mitchell,  2009).  With  these  frameworks  in  mind,  one  can  then  delve  into  the  four 
major  strategies  most  commonly  wielded  by  regimes  to  ensure  effectiveness. 
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Sanctions 
The  first  tool,  employed  to  enforce  agreements  in  many  international  governance 
structures,  is  sanctions,  or  any  type  of  enforcement  technique  that  relies  on  punishing  the  bad 
behavior  of  states  in  order  to  encourage  good  behavior.  This  is  most  often  accomplished  through 
measures  resembling  trade  restrictions,  where  countries  are  forced  to  comply  with  their  IEA 
commitments  or  face  escalating  fines  and  restrictions  on  trade  (Hovi  &  Underdal,  2018)  in  ways 
that  seek  to  alter  the  consequences  of  a  state’s  actions  (Mitchell,  2009).  Sanctions  are  part  of  the 
toolbox  known  as  punitive  strategies ,  where  regimes  wield  the  ‘stick’  part  of  the 
‘carrot-and-stick’  method  to  punish  bad  behavior  (Mitchell,  2009).  Sanctions  and  other  punitive 
strategies  are  most  effective  when  “victim  states  are  harmed  sufficiently  in  ways  that  give  them 
strong  incentives  to  respond”  (Mitchell,  2009,  p.  169),  as  states  that  fail  to  see  the  downsides  of 
non-compliance  have  no  motivation  to  change  their  behavior  or  work  to  achieve  goals. 
Fundamentally,  the  usage  of  sanctions  almost  always  involves  embracing  the  view  of  the 
enforcement  school  that  non-compliant  behavior  is  deviant  and  represents  “violations  that  have 
to  be  punished”  (Downs  et  al.,  1996,  p.  381)  rather  than  an  expected  behavior  (Chayes  & 
Chayes,  1993).  Regimes  hope  that  escalating  punishments  will  cause  states  to  “forego 
independent  decision  making  in  favor  of  interdependent  decision  making”  (Mitchell,  2009,  p. 
159),  weighing  environmental  problem  solving  as  a  tool  to  achieve  international  success.  In  other 
words,  sanctions  strongly  encourage  states  to  take  environmental  problems  and  the  steps  needed 
to  confront  them  seriously  with  the  idea  that  doing  so  will  eventually  drive  changes  in  the 
behavior  of  non-compliant  states.  This  stance  firmly  entrenches  sanctions  not  only  within  a 
problem-solving  matrix  deeply  informed  by  the  logic  of  consequences  but  one  that  is  directly 
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aimed  at  changing  the  willingness  of  states  to  take  action  by  forcing  both  false  and  reluctant 
positives  to  reconsider,  as  outlined  in  the  Understanding  Decision  Making  section  above.  
As  a  result,  the  usage  of  sanctions  means  that  regimes  are  establishing  strict  and  uniform 
levels  of  compliance  for  all  member  states  while  recommending  negative  reinforcement 
strategies  for  states  that  aren’t  carrying  out  their  commitments  (Chayes  &  Chayes,  1993;  Downs 
et  al.,  1996).  This  requires  consistent  and  clear  rules  and  a  highly  legalized  agreement,  as 
discussed  in  the  Setting  the  Rules  section  above,  to  overcome  the  fact  that  international  politics 
generally  discourages  cooperation  between  nations  because  of  high  opportunity  costs  ( Ringquist 
&  Kostadinova,  2005)  and  to  provide  a  foundation  of  behavior  on  which  to  base  sanctions. 
Critiquing  Sanctions 
In  examining  sanctions,  Chayes  and  Chayes  (1993)  point  out  that,  by  focusing  largely  on 
interests  and  taking  a  rigid  view  of  non-compliant  behavior,  the  usage  of  strict  enforcement  tools 
like  sanctions  effectively  disregards  the  power  of  norm-setting  through  regimes.  Moreover,  such 
a  stance  ignores  both  the  considerable  effort  states  undertake  to  negotiate  and  devise  treaties 
before  joining  them  as  well  as  the  overarching  recognition  that  “states,  like  other  subjects  of 
legal  rules,  operate  under  a  sense  of  obligation  to  conform  their  conduct  to  governing  norms” 
(Chayes  &  Chayes,  1993,  p.  187).  Young  (2011)  agrees,  arguing  that  such  enforcement  is  too 
narrowly  focused  and  instead  urging  regimes  and  researchers  alike  to  focus  on  mechanisms  that 
change  behavior  and  achieve  IEA  goals  “without  resorting  to  negative  forms  of  enforcement” 
(Young,  2011,  p.  19857)  -  a  path  which  the  following  three  tools  largely  follow. 
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Incentives 
The  next  technique  utilized  by  regimes  is  the  opposite  of  sanctions  and  serves  as  the 
‘carrot’  in  the  ‘carrot-and-stick’  paradigm:  incentives,  which  reward  the  good  behavior  of  states. 
Mitchell  (2009)  dubs  these  remunerative  strategies ,  the  promising  of  rewards  to  states  in 
exchange  for  following  through  on  their  commitments  to  an  IEA  or  environmental  regime.  There 
are  also  perception  altering  strategies ,  which  seek  to  alter  the  way  parties  to  an  IEA  view  the 
regime  and  their  behavior  altogether  (Mitchell,  2009).  Notably,  this  includes  cognitive  strategies , 
those  that  seek  to  educate  states  on  why  they  should  change  their  behavior  by  pointing  out  that 
failing  to  follow  through  on  a  commitment  will  result  in  states  missing  out  on  rewards  -  and 
assuming  that,  since  states  do  not  want  that  to  happen,  they  will  modify  their  behavior  (Mitchell, 
2009).  Like  sanctions,  incentive  strategies  are  the  most  effective  when  the  effect  -  which  is 
positive  here  as  opposed  to  negative  with  sanctions  -  outweighs  the  cost  of  taking  action, 
likewise  embracing  an  approach  couched  firmly  in  the  logic  of  consequences.  
There  are  a  variety  of  different  ways  that  environmental  regimes  can  incentivize  good 
behavior.  One  way  this  can  be  done  by  linking  positive  behavior  to  club  goods  (Hovi  & 
Underdal,  2018),  where  high-income  countries  pushing  for  change  connect  positive  steps 
towards  environmental  action  from  lower-income  countries  to  resources  such  as  scientific 
knowledge  or  access  to  free  trade.  This  is  becoming  increasingly  difficult  to  do  because  of  the 
many  ways  such  resources  diffuse  today,  which  are  more  often  than  not  outside  direct 
governmental  control  (Hovi  &  Underdal,  2018).  Another  option  is  to  implement  a  deposit-refund 
system,  where  countries  pay  into  a  regime-managed  fund  (deposit)  while  working  towards  their 
IEA  commitments,  receiving  their  payments  back  if  they  reach  them  (refund)  but  losing  their 
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investment  if  they  fail  (Hovi  &  Underdal,  2018).  While  this  can  be  hard  to  do  because  countries 
headed  towards  non-compliance  would  have  no  incentive  to  begin  depositing  in  the  first  place,  if 
applied  correctly,  it  would  encourage  higher  levels  of  behavior  change  relative  to  abatement 
costs  (Hovi  &  Underdal,  2018).  Using  these  and  other  tools  appropriately  can  encourage  states  to 
continue  their  good  behavior  in  exchange  for  a  variety  of  positive  rewards  from  a  regime. 
Incentive  strategies  can  also  be  about  improving  the  systems  and  regimes  that  enforce 
IEAs  themselves.  Chayes  and  Chayes  (1993)  argue  that  IEAs  should  also  be  enforced  by 
preemptively  addressing  flaws  in  environmental  regimes  that  might  be  preventing  or 
discouraging  states  from  following  through  on  their  commitments.  Specifically,  this  includes 
three  steps:  improving  regime  dispute  resolution,  providing  technical  and  financial  assistance, 
and  increasing  transparency  of  regime  mechanisms  (Chayes  &  Chayes,  1993).  Arguably, 
enforcing  IEAs  through  “these  interacting  measures  of  assistance  and  persuasion  is  less  costly 
and  intrusive  and  is  certainly  less  dramatic  than  coercive  sanctions,  the  easy  and  usual  policy 
elixir  for  noncompliance”  (Chayes  &  Chayes,  1993,  p.  205)  while  also  working  within  other 
international  systems  of  governance,  which  encourages  interaction  and  interplay  between 
different  international  regimes  (Young,  2011). 
Critiquing  Incentives 
The  central  critique  of  incentives  comes  from  Downs  (2000)  and  his  work  highlighting 
the  main  criticism  of  incentives  from  political  economists:  free-riding ,  where  states  take 
advantage  of  IEA  benefits  without  making  a  significant  effort  to  alter  their  actions.  In  offering 
incentives  for  states  to  change  their  behavior  and  achieve  the  goals  of  an  IEA,  political 
economists  zero  in  on  the  role  of  relative  price,  believing  that  states  will  make  decisions  along 
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the  cost-benefit  analysis  spectrum  while  taking  every  opportunity  to  free-ride  on  IEAs  that  have 
a  lower  level  of  specificity  or  legalization  and  often  have  high  levels  of  flexibility  (Downs, 
2000),  as  discussed  in  the  Understanding  Decision  Making  section  above.  While  this  can  be 
addressed  with  more  rigid  structures  for  disbursing  incentives  as  well  as  stricter  punishments 
when  free-riding  behavior  is  noticed  (Hovi  &  Underdal,  2018),  free-riding  behavior  remains  a 
key  problem  with  incentives  as  a  tool  for  promoting  effectiveness. 
Norms 
The  third  tool  that  serves  as  a  mechanism  for  creating  IEA  effectiveness  is  norm-setting, 
or  the  creation  of  unofficial  standards  for  behavior  that  more  subtly  influence  states  to  change 
their  behavior.  Young  (2018)  calls  this  framework  constitutive  effectiveness ,  noting  that  “the 
purpose  of  some  regimes  is  to  establish  public  order  within  an  issue  domain  or  a  spatially  defined 
area  rather  than  to  articulate  specific  behavioural  requirements  and  prohibitions”  (Young,  2018, 
p.  463).  In  other  words,  even  if  countries  aren’t  specifically  compliant  to  a  given  regime,  their 
behavior  will  be  modified  by  the  very  existence  of  the  regime  within  the  sphere  of  international 
governance.  Norm-setting  can  also  be  done  through  goal-setting  effectiveness ,  the  recognition 
that  the  simple  act  of  setting  a  goal  for  the  international  community  to  strive  towards  can  drive 
changes  on  a  state-by-state  basis,  and  generative  effectiveness,  which  provides  resources  and 
scientific  or  procedural  knowledge  that  help  states  frame  environmental  issues  (Young,  2018). 
Regardless  of  the  way  a  regime  goes  about  establishing  norms  within  international 
systems,  they  are  always  working  to  shift  the  values  behind  decisions  as  opposed  to  directly 
affecting  a  states’  cost-benefit  analysis  through  sanctions  or  incentives.  Therefore,  norm-setting 
falls  firmly  into  the  logic  of  appropriateness,  as  it  seeks  not  to  change  the  actual  costs  of  taking 
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action  or  the  rewards  from  such  action  but  to  reshape  why  states  would  choose  to  follow  through 
on  their  commitments.  Indeed,  the  goal  at  the  heart  of  norm-setting  is  to  influence  the  behavior 
and  goal-setting  of  states  by  shifting  them  from  viewing  environmental  problems  purely  through 
a  logic  of  consequences  to  approaching  them  through  a  logic  of  appropriateness. 
The  setting  of  norms  can  take  many  different  forms  within  environmental  regime 
structures.  In  issue-specific  reciprocity,  countries  currently  in  compliance  with  an  IEA  would 
switch  to  less  aggressive  goals  to  expose  the  failures  of  non-compliant  countries,  establishing  a 
norm  of  what  happens  to  states  who  fail  to  keep  up  with  their  commitments  -  public, 
international  embarrassment  (Hovi  &  Underdal,  2018).  Along  these  lines,  Mitchell  (2009)  offers 
normative  strategies,  which  go  deeper  by  challenging  states  to  shift  what  they  value  in  decision 
making  to  match  that  of  the  regime  itself.  These  strategies  can  be  particularly  effective  because 
“[s]tates  that  are  convinced  that  certain  behaviors  harm  their  own  interests  –  regardless  of  what 
other  states  do  –  will  avoid  those  behaviors  without  additional  sanctions  or  rewards  being 
needed”  (Mitchell,  2009,  p.  172).  In  other  words,  extremely  effective  norm-setting  could  render 
the  first  two  tools  employed  by  regimes  -  sanctions  and  incentives  -  moot  by  getting  states  to 
fundamentally  change  how  they  approach  decision  making  in  the  first  place. 
Critiquing  Norms 
A  crucial  observation  about  norm-setting  (see  Vollenweider,  2013)  is  that  it  inherently 
assumes  that  states  actually  care  whether  or  not  their  behavior  is  in  violation  of  international 
norms.  Using  norm-setting  as  a  tool  for  effectiveness  can  also  be  challenging  if  an  environmental 
regime  is  unable  to  align  the  norms  they  would  like  to  produce  with  the  social  and  cultural  values 
of  regime  parties  (Vollenweider,  2013;  see  also  Young,  2011).  Hovi  and  Underdal  (2018)  note 
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that  these  flaws  with  the  setting  of  norms  often  arise  in  what  they  call  deep  IEAs ,  or  those  that 
necessitate  major  behavior  changes  or  large-scale  goals  -  e.g.  reducing  carbon  emissions  to 
address  climate  change  -  as  opposed  to  shallow  IEAs  -  e.g.  increasing  the  number  of  electric 
vehicle  charging  stations  -  which  only  require  small-scale  shifts.  Put  another  way,  the  greater  the 
change  required,  the  less  effective  unilateral  usage  of  norms  will  be  in  achieving  effectiveness. 
Furthermore,  Downs  et  al.  (1996)  argue  that  states  only  join  treaties  that  they  believe  they 
can  comply  with  while  ignoring  the  treaties  that  with  which  they  wouldn’t  want  or  be  able  to 
comply  and  even  disregarding  IEAs  with  which  they  believe  others  will  not  be  able  to  comply. 
Simply  put,  just  as  orchestras  will  usually  avoid  music  that  they  cannot  play  well,  states  will 
rarely  spend  a  great  deal  of  time  and  effort  negotiating  agreements  that  they  know  they  -  or  other 
states  -  will  violate  (Downs  et  al.,  1996).  Therefore,  in  certain  situations  norm-setting  can  be 
wholly  ineffective  as  some  states  will  simply  have  no  interest  in  joining  an  IEA  -  although  if 
used  in  conjunction  with  other  tools  for  effectiveness,  notably  sanctions,  such  norms  could 
eventually  force  states  to  change  their  underlying  values  and  embrace  a  regime. 
Capacity-Building 
The  fourth  and  final  tool  most  often  encouraged  by  environmental  regimes  is  the  building 
up  of  capacity  for  states  that  simply  aren’t  in  a  place  -  economically  or  politically  -  to  take  any 
kind  of  meaningful  environmental  action.  Capacity-building  seeks  to  address  the  lack  of  ability 
Hovi  and  Underdal  (2018)  identify  in  the  Understanding  Decision  Making  section  above  for 
states  in  the  unenviable  situation  of  being  unable  to  make  progress  on  their  environmental 
commitments,  despite  a  genuine  desire  to  do  so. 
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Indeed,  some  regimes  “are  instrumental  in  identifying  emerging  issues  and  framing  them 
in  terms  of  needs  for  governance”  (Young,  2018,  pp.  463-464),  and  capacity-building  often 
follows  the  setting  of  norms  as  discussed  in  the  previous  section.  Regimes  can  employ  a  variety 
of  opportunity  altering  strategies  that  attempt  to  change  the  behavior  of  states  before  they  can 
even  begin  to  approach  an  IEA,  the  most  common  of  which  are  generative  strategies ,  which 
provide  resources,  expertise,  and  information  to  encourage  and  reduce  the  cost  of  IEA-compliant 
behavior  (Mitchell,  2009).  Such  an  approach  can  also  include  preclusive  strategies ,  which 
prevent  states  that  might  not  even  be  a  party  to  an  IEA  yet  from  behaving  counter  to  the  goals  of 
an  IEA  -  or  at  least  make  unwanted  behavior  considerably  more  costly  (Mitchell,  2009).  While 
preclusive  strategies  embrace  a  more  negative  enforcement  framework,  they  too  seek  to  help 
states  build  capacity  in  the  right  places  by  discouraging  investment  in  undesired  behaviors. 
In  arguing  for  the  usage  of  this  tool,  Sand  (2016)  uses  the  example  of  CITES,  the  1992 
Convention  on  International  Trade  in  Endangered  Species  of  Wild  Fauna  and  Flora.  From  the 
start,  CITES  utilized  non-coercive  strategies  -  building  capacity  through  sharing  access  to 
resources  and  by  providing  expert  advice  -  before  using  default  enforcement  penalties  like  trade 
sanctions.  By  embracing  this  process  and  not  immediately  leaping  to  negative  enforcement,  this 
version  of  capacity-building  changed  the  behavior  of  80  percent,  or  20  out  of  25,  of  the  states 
originally  in  non-compliance  with  CITES  (Sand,  2016). 
Something  crucial  to  note  is  that  capacity-building,  unlike  the  other  three  major 
techniques  for  enforcing  agreements  discussed  in  this  review,  does  not  automatically  rely  on 
highly  legalized  or  specific  IEAs  -  or  even  any  one  environmental  regime.  Even  in  the  absence  of 
an  agreement  altogether,  an  international  regime  can  provide  critical  knowledge,  build  up 
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infrastructure,  and  deploy  experts  within  a  state  to  better  prepare  it  to  take  environmental  action. 
This  is  a  major  point  to  acknowledge  and  embrace  because  it  means  that  capacity-building  can 
always  be  occurring  even  as  IEAs  are  negotiated  and  the  specific  steps  towards  addressing  a 
problem  like  climate  change  or  reducing  toxic  pollution  are  debated.  A  lack  of  dependency  on 
rules  frees  capacity-building  from  many  of  the  bureaucratic  tendencies  of  international 
governance  systems,  creating  a  path  for  progress  in  the  face  of  international  gridlock. 
Critiquing  Capacity-Building 
Since  capacity-building  can  and  often  does  occur  outside  the  presence  of  a  specific  IEA, 
as  mentioned  above,  criticism  of  this  tool  looks  different  than  the  previous  tools.  The  major  area 
of  critique  comes  from  political  economists,  who  argue  that  regimes  have  better  ways  to  spend 
their  money  to  maximize  success  than  in  countries  far  enough  behind  that  they  are  unable  to  even 
begin  changing  their  behavior  (Rezai,  2011;  see  also  Downs  et  al.,  1996).  However,  it  is  crucial 
to  note  that  this  economic-centric  critique  of  the  opportunity  cost  of  investing  in  climate  policy 
disregards  the  fact  that  not  investing  in  state  capacity  is  not  merely  a  neutral  but  a  negative 
outcome,  as  climate  change  will  eventually  bring  considerable  harm  to  the  global  economy 
(Rezai,  2011).  Even  with  that  in  mind,  Grabs  (2018)  is  one  of  many  scholars  who  advocates  that 
private,  rather  than  public,  governance  systems  offer  the  best  ways  to  build  capacity  without 
comprising  the  resources  of  major  environmental  regimes.  
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Conclusion 
In  seeking  to  address  the  wide  range  of  environmental  problems  countries  face,  the 
international  community  often  turns  to  environmental  agreements.  This  paper  reviews  the  theory 
surrounding  one  component  of  IEAs,  effectiveness,  through  two  research  questions: 
1. How  do  scholars  define  the  effectiveness  of  international  environmental  agreements? 
2. What  are  the  metrics  by  which  scholars  can  assess  the  structure  and  effectiveness  of  an 
international  environmental  agreement? 
The  findings  of  this  review,  as  well  as  two  key  takeaways,  several  critiques  of  IEAs,  and  a  few 
areas  for  further  research,  are  summarized  below. 
Four  central  topics  emerge  from  this  paper’s  analysis.  First,  the  frameworks  in  this  paper 
grounded  it  in  the  same  principles  often  employed  by  regimes  in  crafting  IEAs.  Using 
counterfactuals  in  defining  effectiveness  provided  a  focus  on  direct  comparison  between  what 
did  happen  with  an  IEA  to  what  might  have  happened  without  one  (Young,  2011;  Helm  & 
Sprinz,  2000).  Seeking  to  understand  decisions  through  the  logics  of  consequences  and 
appropriateness  (March  &  Olsen,  1998;  Mitchell,  2009)  and  the  willingness  versus  ability  (Hovi 
&  Underdal,  2018)  dichotomies  created  space  to  directly  connect  mechanisms  for  effectiveness 
with  state  actions.  Combined,  these  structures  provided  the  space  to  delve  deeply  and  precisely 
into  the  theory  on  IEA  effectiveness. 
Second,  this  review  identified  the  similarities  and  differences  between  behavior  change 
and  goal  achievement  as  foundations  for  defining  effectiveness.  Behavior  lies  at  the  cornerstone 
of  effectiveness,  as  an  IEA  that  failed  to  shift  the  behavior  of  states  was  inherently  not  effective 
in  achieving  its  goals.  Moreover,  since  goal  achievement  is  intrinsically  linked  to  behavior 
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change,  an  IEA  that  reached  its  goal  without  influencing  the  behavior  of  member  states  similarly 
cannot  take  credit  for  the  result.  Thus,  effectiveness  is  deeply  tied  to  and  ultimately  inseparable 
from  behavior  change. 
Third,  different  levels  of  legalization,  flexibility,  and  specificity  can  drastically  alter  the 
effectiveness  of  an  IEA.  Higher  levels  of  legalization  are  commonly  observed  among  IEAs  and 
can  decrease  their  economic  impacts  while  having  generally  positive  impacts  on  environmental 
components  (Kim,  2014).  Additionally,  flexibility  mechanisms,  such  as  opt-out  clauses,  tend  to 
be  present  in  all  IEAs,  with  the  most  successful  IEAs  featuring  them  prominently  (Mitchell, 
2009;  Helfer,  2013).  And  IEAs  that  are  high  in  specificity,  such  as  those  that  specifically  outline 
issues  of  climate  justice  (Klinsky,  2016),  are  more  effective  than  low  specificity  IEAs. 
Finally,  the  four  main  response  management  tools  have  strengths  and  weaknesses,  with 
each  offering  important  ways  to  solve  different  problems.  Sanctions,  incentives,  and 
norm-setting  all  deal  with  states  that  have  the  ability  to  act  but  not  the  willingness  (Hovi  & 
Underdal,  2018),  with  sanctions  representing  an  escalation  in  enforcement  by  a  regime  (Chayes 
&  Chayes,  1996)  as  compared  to  rewarding  positive  behavior  or  setting  a  standard  for  behavior. 
Sanctions  and  incentives  are  also  couched  within  a  logic  of  consequences,  while  norm-setting 
lies  more  firmly  within  a  logic  of  appropriateness  (March  &  Olsen,  1998).  On  the  other  hand, 
capacity-building  addresses  states  that  lack  the  ability  to  act  due  to  a  dearth  of  resources  -  and 
unlike  the  other  three  tools,  this  can  occur  outside  the  specific  parameters  of  a  highly  legalized 
IEA  or  an  environmental  regime  altogether.  Each  tool  has  a  different  scenario  for  which  its  use 
increases  IEA  effectiveness. 
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Central  Takeaways 
This  review  offers  two  main  takeaways:  the  definition  of  effectiveness  also  influences 
how  one  addresses  improving  an  IEA  and  every  piece  of  the  mechanism  toolbox  should  be 
wielded  in  concert  to  maximize  effectiveness.  First,  how  effectiveness  is  defined  is  crucial  to 
understanding  how  to  approach  improving  it  -  in  particular,  whether  one  uses  counterfactuals  or 
another  option,  such  as  compliance,  as  a  guiding  principle.  While  both  paths  can  use  behavior 
change  and  goal  achievement,  compliance  as  a  framework  focuses  on  comparing  observed 
activity  to  the  actions  a  state  committed  to  in  an  IEA,  whereas  counterfactuals  allow  for  the 
juxtaposition  of  factors.  Second,  as  touched  on  in  the  previous  section,  there  are  many  tools  that 
can  increase  IEA  effectiveness,  but  the  most  effective  path  forward  appears  to  be  using  a 
combination  of  them.  In  other  words,  environmental  regimes  should  wield  sanctions,  incentives, 
norm-setting,  and  capacity-building,  adjusting  the  usage  of  each  depending  on  the  states  being 
targeted  and  the  goals  of  a  given  IEA,  in  order  to  most  effectively  enforce  an  agreement. 
Critiquing  IEAs 
While  the  foregoing  has  argued  for  evaluating  IEAs  against  the  goals  identified  by  the 
states  creating  them,  one  can  also  evaluate  agreements  against  the  more  political  goals  of 
advocates.  This  includes  but  is  certainly  not  limited  to:  the  reduction  of  inequality,  decreasing 
disenfranchisement,  uplifting  climate  justice,  and  prioritizing  indigenous  perspectives.  Castro 
(2017)  argues  that  there  are  problems  with  structures  that  often  reinforce  a  colonial  perspective 
of  global  problem-solving,  with  high-income  countries  holding  back  resources  and  threatening 
sanctions  on  low-  and  middle-income  countries  if  they  do  not  cooperate. 
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Furthermore,  some  scholars  challenge  the  very  idea  that  environmental  problems  on  the 
scale  of  climate  change  can  be  addressed  through  current  political  systems,  such  as  IEAs  and 
environmental  regimes,  arguing  that  instead  what  is  needed  is  an  overhaul  of  the  entire  structure 
(Mullenite,  2017;  see  also  Castro,  2017)  or  a  bottom-up  reconsolidation  of  power  within  existing 
structures  (Klinsky,  2017).  Although  this  review  provides  sufficient  examples  of  a  pathway  for 
effectiveness  to  somewhat  refute  such  an  argument,  there  are  voices  in  the  United  States  and 
elsewhere  that  continue  to  promote  such  methods  for  achieving  success. 
This  review,  and  the  critiques  of  scholars  such  as  Mullenite  (2017)  and  Castro  (2017), 
also  highlights  one  crucial  area  for  further  research  within  the  field  of  IEA  effectiveness:  climate 
justice,  or  the  centering  of  issues  of  inequity  in  environmental  struggles.  One  framework  for  this 
research  is  transitional  justice,  “theory  and  practice  aimed  at  enabling  purposeful  transitions  from 
periods  of  deep  injustices  into  more  peaceful  regimes”  (Klinsky,  2017,  “Introduction”,  para.  2). 
Future  discussions  of  effectiveness  should  explore  ways  to  incorporate  issues  of  climate  justice 
into  both  definitions  of  effectiveness  as  well  as  methods  for  enforcing  IEAs. 
Closing 
As  climate  change  continues  to  worsen,  and  the  margins  for  error  in  addressing  it  further 
narrow,  the  effectiveness  of  international  environmental  agreements  and  the  regimes  that 
administer  them  will  only  become  more  important.  This  review  offers  significant  conclusions 
about  definitions  of  effectiveness  and  the  methods  by  which  it  can  be  increased.  Ultimately,  the 
environmental  problems  of  the  21st  century  can  only  be  confronted  by  thoroughly  studying  past 
IEAs  and  crafting  new  ones  that  wield  the  best  available  tools  to  maximize  effectiveness.  
43 
References 
Bernauer,  T.,  &  Siegfried,  T.  (2008).  Compliance  and  Performance  in  International  Water 
Agreements:  The  Case  of  the  Naryn/Syr  Darya  Basin.  Global  Governance,  14 (4), 
479-501.  Retrieved  December  13,  2019,  from  www.jstor.org/stable/27800725 . 
Castro,  D.  (2017).  The  Colonial  Aspects  of  the  International  Environmental  Law  –  Treaties  as 
Promoters  of  Continuous  Structural  Violence.  Groningen  Journal  of  International  Law, 
Forthcoming .  Retrieved  April  12th,  2020,  from  http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3051164 . 
Chayes,  A.,  &  Chayes,  A.  (1993).  On  Compliance.  International  Organization,  47 (2),  175-205. 
Retrieved  January  16,  2020,  from  www.jstor.org/stable/2706888 . 
Downs,  G.,  Rocke,  D.,  &  Barsoom,  P.  (1996).  Is  the  Good  News  about  Compliance  Good  News 
about  Cooperation?  International  Organization,  50 (3),  379-406.  Retrieved  January  14, 
2020,  from  www.jstor.org/stable/2704030 . 
Downs,  G.  (2000).  “Constructing  Effective  Environmental  Regimes.”  Annual  Review  of  Political 
Science  3 (6),  25-42.  Retrieved  January  14,  2020,  from 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4db8/e0af3eee9da806a6e4a881296ebb832e58ed.pdf . 
Grabs,  J.  (2018).  The  Effectiveness  of  Private  Sustainability  Governance:  A  Microinstitutional 
Approach .  University  of  Münster. 
Helfer,  L.  R.  (2013).  INTERDISCIPLINARY  PERSPECTIVES  ON  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 
AND  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS.  In  Flexibility  in  International  Agreements ,  eds. 
J.  Dunoff  &  M.  A.  Pollack  (pp.  175-196).  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press. 
Retrieved  March  10,  2020,  from  https://ssrn.com/abstract=1930379 . 
Helm,  C.,  &  Sprinz,  D.  (2000).  Measuring  the  Effectiveness  of  International  Environmental 
Regimes.  The  Journal  of  Conflict  Resolution,  44 (5),  630-652.  Retrieved  February  14, 
2020,  from  www.jstor.org/stable/174647 . 
Houghton,  K.  A.,  &  Naughton,  H.  T.  (2014).  International  Environmental  Agreement 
Effectiveness:  A  Review  of  Empirical  Studies.  In  Comparative  Law  and  Economics ,  eds. 
T.  Eisenberg  and  G.  B.  Ramello  (pp.  442-55).  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press. 
Hovi,  J.,  &  Underdal,  A.  (2018).  Implementation,  Compliance,  and  Effectiveness  of  Policies  and 
Institutions.  In  Global  Climate  Policy:  Actors,  Concepts,  and  Enduring  Challenges ,  eds. 
U.  Luterbacher  and  D.  F.  Sprinz  (pp.  297-322).  Cambridge,  MA:  The  MIT  Press. 
44 
Kim,  Y.  (2014).  Essays  on  the  Effectiveness  of  International  Environmental  Agreements: 
Quantitative  Analysis  on  Environmental  and  Economic  Aspects .  Ph.D.  dissertation. 
Waseda  University:  International  Studies. 
Klinsky,  S.  (2016).  (Rep.).  Climate  Strategies.  Retrieved  April  10,  2020,  from 
www.jstor.org/stable/resrep16185 . 
March,  J.,  &  Olsen,  J.  (1998).  The  Institutional  Dynamics  of  International  Political  Orders. 
International  Organization,  52 (4),  943-969.  Retrieved  February  11,  2020,  from 
www.jstor.org/stable/2601363 . 
Mitchell,  R.  B.  (2009).  Evaluating  the  Effectiveness  of  International  Environmental  Institutions. 
In  International  Politics  and  the  Environment  (pp.  147-180).  New  York,  NY:  Sage 
Publications  Ltd. 
Mullenite,  J.  (2017).  “Paris  Can’t  Save  Us”.  In  Beyond  Electoralism:  Reflections  on  anarchy, 
populism,  and  the  crisis  of  electoral  politics.  ACME:  An  International  Journal  for 
Critical  Geographies,  16 (4),  18-19.  Retrieved  April  12th,  2020,  from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321110221_Beyond_Electoralism_Reflections_ 
on_anarchy_populism_and_the_crisis_of_electoral_politics . 
Rezai,  A.  (2011).  The  Opportunity  Cost  of  Climate  Policy:  A  Question  of  Reference.  The 
Scandinavian  Journal  of  Economics,  113 (4),  885-903.  Retrieved  April  11,  2020,  from 
www.jstor.org/stable/41407750 . 
Ringquist,  E.,  &  Kostadinova,  T.  (2005).  Assessing  the  Effectiveness  of  International 
Environmental  Agreements:  The  Case  of  the  1985  Helsinki  Protocol.  American  Journal 
of  Political  Science  49  (1),  86-102. 
Sand,  P.  H.  (2016).  The  Effectiveness  of  Multilateral  Environmental  Agreements:  Theory  and 
Practice .  Joensuu,  Finland:  University  of  Eastern  Finland  Law  School,  UNEP  13th 
Training  Course  on  International  Environmental  Law-Making  and  Diplomacy. 
Vollenweider,  J.  (2013).  The  Effectiveness  of  International  Environmental  Agreements. 
International  Environmental  Agreements  13  (3),  343-67. 
Young,  O.  R.  (2011).  Effectiveness  of  international  environmental  regimes:  Existing  knowledge, 
cutting-edge  themes,  and  research  strategies.  Proceedings  of  the  National  Academy  of 
Sciences,  108 (50),  19853–19860.  Retrieved  December  13th,  2020,  from 
https://www.pnas.org/content/108/50/19853 . 
Young,  O.  R.  (2018).  Research  Strategies  to  Assess  the  Effectiveness  of  International 
Environmental  Regimes.  Nature  Sustainability,  1 (9),  461-465.  Retrieved  December  13th, 
2020,  from  https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-018-0132-y . 
